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Throughout the United States, for thousands of children
languishing in foster care, adoption can seem like an unattainable fantasy;
for the lucky few who are adopted, however, reality sets in when they first
learn that their adoption has an unimaginable consequence. That is, once
they are adopted, they will likely lose the ability-and certainly the
right-to have contact with their biological siblings, often for the
remainder of their childhoods.' Undoubtedly, from a legal standpoint,
"once an unrelated adoption takes place, the child's previous ties are
completely severed. For all practical and legal purposes, the child's
biological relationships end." 2 Adopted children face this heart-wrenching
scenario despite the fact that many states, as well as the federal
government, now recognize the importance of maintaining sibling bonds
when children are in the foster care system.3 Similarly, for children
enmeshed in custody battles, judges often recognize the critical
importance of keeping siblings together, 4 and, except in very limited
circumstances,5 are unwilling to involuntarily separate siblings when
Jill Elaine Hasday, Siblings in Law, 65 VAND. L. REv. 897, 906 (2012) ("The operative
premise [of traditional adoption law] was that biological siblings were legally connected
through their relationship with a shared parent or parents. Once a child's legal
relationship with her birth parents ended, siblings no longer had any legally recognized
tie to each other."); see also In re M.M., 619 N.E.2d 702, 713 (Ill. 1993) (positing that
when a child is adopted, "[i]t then becomes the right of the adoptive parents to decide
whether to permit or deny continued contact with the child's biological family"); In re
Donte A., 631 N.E.2d 257, 258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (denying the request of five brothers
who asked the court "to consent to adoption only if the prospective adopting family
agrees to reasonable post-adoption sibling visitation"); In re Jamison, 4 N.E.3d 889, 901
(Mass. 2014).
2 Harold K. v. Ryan B., 730 N.E.2d 88, 95 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
See Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-351, 122 Stat. 3949 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 671 (2012)) [hereinafter Fostering
Connections Act] (creating an obligation for states to establish avenues for sibling contact
while the children are in foster care). In fact, many social workers have spent countless
months searching to find foster care placements that would allow these children to remain
together.
4 See, e.g., Ebert v. Ebert, 346 N.E.2d 240, 242-43 (N.Y. 1976) (finding that siblings,
upon divorce, should remain together as long as the parent granting custody is fit);
Wiskoski v. Wiskoski, 629 A.2d 996, 998-99 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (stating that, when
making policy determinations, the policy of Pennsylvania is that siblings be raised
together); 0. v. P., 560 S.W.2d 122, 127 (Tex. App. 1977) (determining that siblings
should remain together when deciding a custody case, absent any compelling reasons
against it).
5 In disputed custody cases, courts consider the interests of the siblings when
determining which parent is granted custody. However, when the custody arrangement is
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making legal custody determinations.6 Yet none of those protections apply
to children who are adopted.7
In many cases, foster care is transitory, uncertain, and
impermanent, and does not result in the foster parent adopting the child,
leaving little doubt that a permanent adoptive home is better than foster
care for most children. 9 On the other hand, especially for children who
have long-established relationships with their brothers and sisters, sound
public policy dictates that adoption not require children to sacrifice the
only family they have ever known in order to secure a more certain future.
The challenge, therefore, is to create a way for children in foster care to
maintain a relationship with their biological siblings after they have been
adopted, despite the legal-and practical-hurdles to doing so. 10 Using
undisputed, and parents come to an agreement regarding a custody arrangement, siblings
usually "have no access to the courts to vocalize their concerns or wishes regarding the
custody decision." Ellen Marrus, "Where Have You Been, Fran?" The Right of Siblings
to Seek Court Access to Override Parental Denial of Visitation, 66 TENN. L. REV. 977,
979 (1999) [hereinafter Marrus, Where Have You Been, Fran?].
6 See supra note 4.
7 In cases where siblings are separated by adoption or foster care, federal law does make
some of its funding to states for foster care and adoption services conditional on the
state's consenting to make reasonable efforts "to provide for frequent visitation or other
ongoing interaction between the siblings, unless that State documents that frequent
visitation or other ongoing interaction would be contrary to the safety or well-being of
any of the siblings." Fostering Connections Act, supra note 3, § 671(a)(31)(B). That law,
however, has had "little apparent effect to date." Hasday, supra note 1, at 908.
8 In weighing in on the procedures governing the removal of foster children from foster
homes, the U.S. Supreme Court has defined foster care as "(a) child welfare service
which provides substitute family care for a- planned period for a child when his own
family cannot care for him for a temporary or extended period and when adoption is
neither desirable nor possible." Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality & Reform,
431 U.S. 816, 823 (1977).
9 This statement is not without its detractors. In his thought-provoking article, Swimming
Upstream Against the Great Adoption Tide: Making the Case for "Impermanence, "
Sacha Coupet makes a case against the "reputed panacean effect attributed to adoption"
with its "one-size-fits-all" solution. Sacha Coupet, Swimming Upstream Against the
Great Adoption Tide: Making the Case for "Impermanence," 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 405,
411 (2005) (arguing that "despite the positive benefits intended to flow from adoptive
arrangements, not all children-even those whose biological parents are unable to care
for them-would benefit equally from this permanent and radical configuration of the
family"); see also Andre P. Derdeyn, Andrew R. Rogoff & Scott W. Williams,
Alternatives to Absolute Termination of Parental Rights After Long-Term Foster Care, 31
VAND. L. REV. 1165, 1166 (1978) (questioning whether "absolute termination of the
natural parents' rights and subsequent adoption constitute the optimal alternative for all
children after long-term foster care").
1o There are logistics issues to address, for example, if siblings live far away from each
other. If some siblings still live with the original birth family and the parental rights
86 Vol. I19: 1
Separated At Adoption
the psychological research on sibling attachment and loss as a
springboard, this article explores the many ways children are harmed by
the law's failure to ensure that the bonds they have developed with their
biological siblings are not permanently severed following adoption. It
asserts that a child's "need for continuity in intimate relationships"" puts
an onus on the state to provide children who are adopted with an avenue to
maintain those important familial relationships and to shape their laws to
better protect children from the psychological harms of having siblings
with whom they have formed significant bonds removed from their lives
forever. This article suggests a measure that allows for continued contact
between biological siblings even after they are adopted without intruding
on the fundamental constitutional liberty interest of parents, including
adoptive parents, at issue in the United States Supreme Court case of
Troxel v. Granville. 12 Although, under Troxel and earlier Supreme Court
jurisprudence, parents have an interest "in the care, custody, and control of
their children,"' 3 that interest should not be paramount to the children's
interest in maintaining relationships with sometimes the only family they
have ever known.
Specifically, Part II of the article describes the current state of the
law regarding siblings' legal rights to maintain a relationship with each
other. The centerpiece of this Part is a discussion of Troxel v. Granville,
the seminal United States Supreme Court decision that addresses third
party visitation, and reaffirms, under the Due Process Clause, a parent's
(including an adoptive parent) fundamental liberty interest in the "care,
custody and control of their child" as "perhaps the oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court."' 4 Part II also
provides an overview of existing state laws and how they may create
potential openings for post-adoption sibling visitation.
Next, Part III of this article discusses the historic transition from
closed to open adoptions as a movement that has created the possibility for
terminated involved drug use, there may be some legitimate reasons for adoptive parents
to be concerned with ongoing contact. For a discussion of the hurdles, see Ass'N FOR




1i Katherine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for
Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV.
879, 882 (1984).
12 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
13 Id. at 65.
14 Id. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
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siblings to establish legally-sanctioned contact with each other post-
adoption. This Part first analyzes the history of closed adoptions and the
harm that has resulted from the secrecy connected with such
"confidential" adoptions. It then recounts the significant progress that has
been made toward a more open model of adoption vis-A-vis adopted
children and their birth parents, but that has not yet been fully extended to
relationships with birth siblings.
Part IV explains the psychology of sibling relationships, including
(1) sibling attachment and how it is even more pronounced between
siblings whose family lives have been so disrupted they have ended up in
foster care; and (2) psychological loss that siblings experience when they
are separated through adoption. Part V then discusses the possibilities and
challenges of post-adoption contact between siblings. This involves (1) a
discussion of post-adoption contact agreements, including post-adoption
contact agreements between birth parents and adoptive parents permitted
by state statutes, and post-adoption contact agreements recognized by a
few state courts in the absence.of state statutes; and (2) a general overview
of mediation, including a discussion of the unrealized potential mediation
could play in facilitating post-adoption contact agreements. Finally, the
article concludes in Part VI with a description of steps states should take
to create avenues for children adopted from foster care to have ongoing
visitation with their siblings-of-origin.
II. Legal Background for Post-Adoption Sibling Visitation
A. Third Parties and the Courts
The United States Constitution provides little guidance to courts in
family law matters, generally,' 5 and even less when it comes to the area of
children's rights. Indeed, the Constitution is devoid of evidence that the
framers of the Constitution contemplated the rights of children.16 In the
wake of so little Constitutional guidance, it is no surprise that the Supreme
Court has struggled to create a coherent construct for children's rights, let
alone siblings' rights.17 Although the United States Supreme Court has
15 ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN 32 (1996); see also Janet L.
Dolgin, The Constitution as Family Arbiter, A Moral in the Mess?, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
337, 337 (2002) ("[Cjases involving children and the parent-child relationship have
resisted satisfactory resolution by constitutional principles because they involve precisely
those aspects of the larger 'debate about family' that bewilder Americans.").
16 MNOOKIN, supra note 15.
17 William Wesley Patton & Sara Latz, Severing Hansel from Gretel: An Analysis of
Siblings' Association Rights, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 745, 769 (1994) ("The [United States
Supreme] Court is peculiarly ill-equipped to define continually evolving social concepts
88 Vol. 19:1I
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addressed some issues relating to family rights, it has "not specifically
addressed the question of siblings' rights to maintain contact with each
other."' 8 That said, the right of a child to obtain visitation with her
biological sibling once her sibling has been adopted is most significantly
undermined by the adoptive parents' fundamental right under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to raise their child "as they
see fit."19 Although the United States Supreme Court has indeed found
this right to be fundamental, it also has made clear that the states have the
authority at times to infringe on it.20 Moreover, although no Supreme
Court decision specifically refers to "adoptive" parents, they enjoy the
same rights as biological parents under state law. 2 1
22 2At common law, third parties had no legal right to visitation.2
24Although the courts' reception to third party claims has been mixed,
like the 'family,' in part because these are highly individualistic, yet ironically normative,
judgments requiring a delicate balance of individual predilections with empirical
evidence which often belies gut-level reactions.").
18 Barbara Jones, Do Siblings Possess Constitutional Rights?, 78 CORNELL L. REV.
1187, 1195 (1993).
19 Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down a state law that required
attendance at a public school as violating the Due Process Clause because the parents had
the "right" to decide whether or not their child would attend a public school); Meyer, 262
U.S. at 390 (finding that parents had a liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment
in hiring the plaintiff to instruct their child in a foreign language). See Randi
Mandelbaum, Delicate Balances: Assessing the Needs and Rights of Siblings in Foster
Care to Maintain Their Relationships Post-Adoption, 41 N.M. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2012).
20 E.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) (stating that the court
recognized the state's authority to limit parental freedom by creating child labor laws and
requiring school attendance).
21 See Michael J. Higdon, When Informal Adoption Meets Intestate Succession: The
Cultural Myopia of the Equitable Adoption Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 227
(2008). This is only true, however, once an adoption has been finalized under the law.
Until the adoption is finalized, adoptive parents are simply "prospective adoptive
parents" and their "liberty interests are arguably less than those of biological custodial
parents because permanent legal custody is still contingent upon the adoption's
finalization." Patton & Latz, supra note 17, at 772.
22 "Third party" here refers to any person other than the legal parents and includes
siblings and grandparents as well as others. See, e.g., Webb v. Webb, 546 So. 2d 1062
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Brewer v. Brewer, 533 S.E.2d 541 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
23 See Solangel Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn't Know Best: Quasi-
Parents and Parental Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L. REV. 865, 867
(2003) [hereinafter Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn't Know Best]; see also
In re Adoption of C.A, 137 P.3d 318 (Colo. 2006); In re C.T.G., 179 P.3d 213, 216
(Colo. Ct. App. 2007); In re Hood, 847 P.2d 1300, 1303 (Kan. 1993); Kulla v. McNulty,
472 N.W.2d 175, 181-82 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
24 See, e.g., John DeWitt Gregory, Blood Ties, A Rationale for Child Visitation by Legal
Strangers, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351, 372 (1998).
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critics have claimed that court decisions are "increasingly relying more on
function than form." 25 That is, "[p]arenthood itself is increasingly seen as
a functional status, rather than one derived from biology or legal
entitlement."26 By the mid-1990's, all states had passed statutes allowing
for grandparent visitation; yet less than half had granted third parties-
most of whom were either stepparents or blood relatives such as
siblings-standing to seek visitation even if it arguably was in the best
27interests of the child. Overall, however, from the 1960s through the
1990s,28 state courts increasingly recognize standing for, and awarded
visitation to, attachment figures other than legal parents. 29 This trend came
to an abrupt halt after the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in Troxel
v. Granville.30
The United States Supreme Court's granting certiorari in Troxel v.
Granville in 199931 "raised expectations that the Court would provide
clear guidance on how and vhen states could interfere with legal parents'
decisions regarding visitation between their child and third parties, and
how the 'best interests of the child' standard should be applied in the third
party visitation context."32 The Court failed to meet expectations,
unabashedly declaring "[w]e do not, and need not, define today the precise
scope of the parental due process right in the visitation context." 33
In Troxel, the Supreme Court was specifically tasked with
reviewing a petition for visitation rights filed by the grandparents of two
25 Kristine L. Roberts, State Supreme Court Applications of Troxel v. Granville and the
Courts' Reluctance to Declare Grandparent Visitation Statutes Unconstitutional, 41
FAM. CT. REV. 14, 16 (2003) (citing Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An
Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835,
893 (2000)).
26 Garrison, supra note 25.
27 See, e.g., Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn't Know Best, supra note 23, at
867-68 & 868 n.6.
28 New York State became the first state to enact a third party visitation statute in 1966.
Roberts, supra note 25, at 15 n.16.
29 See Andre P. Derdeyn & Mark Jennings, Forensic Community Child and Adolescent
Psychiatry, in HANDBOOK OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT DAY TREATMENT AND CMTY.
PSYCHIATRY 115, 119 (Harinder S. Ghuman & Richard M. Sarles eds., 1998).
30 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73 (2000).
31 Troxel v. Granville, 527 U.S. 1069 (1999).
32 Rebecca L. Scharf, Psychological Parentage, Troxel, and the Best Interests of the
Child, 13 GEORGETOWN J. GENDER & L. 615, 624 n.76 (2012) (citing Ellen Marrus, Over
the Hills and Through the Woods to Grandparents' House We Go: Or Do We, Post-
Troxel?, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 751, 793 (2001).
33 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73.
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children pursuant to a Washington state statute 34 that provided: "Any
person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time . .. [t]he
court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve
the best interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of
circumstances." 35 The grandparents in Troxel v. Granville had requested
that the lower court grant them overnight visitation 36 with their two
granddaughters whose father, their son, had recently committed suicide.37
Specifically, the grandparents had requested two weekends of visitation
per month and two weeks during the summer. The children's mother
opposed the request and refused to allow overnight visits or permit the
daughters to visit their grandparents more than once a month. 3 8 Over the
mother's objections, the trial court ultimately found that increased
visitation was in the children's best interests, 39 and ordered visitation one
weekend per month, one week during the summer, and four hours on each
of the grandparents' birthdays.40 On appeal, the Washington Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the grandparents could not attain any legal
visitation with their grandchildren under the Washington statute because
the statute unconstitutionally violated the right of the mother to raise her
children "free from state interference." 4 1 The Washington Supreme Court
found two distinct reasons to strike down the Washington statute. First, the
statute did not require a showing of harm to the child.42 Second, it swept
too broadly by allowing "any person at any time" to petition for "forced
visitation" as long as it was in the best interest of the child.43
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,44 and
subsequently issued a plurality opinion written by Justice O'Connor, along
with two concurring and three dissenting opinions. 45 In her plurality
opinion, Justice O'Connor held that the Washington state statute was
invalid, but only as applied to the specific factual landscape of that case.
34 WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1994); Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61.
3 WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3).
36 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61.
37 WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3); Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61.
31 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Smith v. Stilwell, 969 P.2d 21, 27 (Wash. 1998) (en banc).
42 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 57.
45 There were six opinions in total: a plurality opinion by Justice O'Connor, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices Breyer and Ginsburg; two concurring
opinions by Justices Souter and Thomas; and three dissenting opinions, by Justices
Kennedy, Scalia, and Stevens. Id.
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Discussing the substantive component of the Due Process Clause, which
protects against government interference with fundamental rights and
liberty interests, the plurality opinion framed the liberty interest that all
parents have in the "care, custody and control of their children" as
"perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this
Court."46 Acknowledging the long history of the Court's recognition,
Justice O'Connor found that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment undoubtedly protected the fundamental right "of parents to
make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their
children." 47 In her opinion, Justice O'Connor began her reasoning by
stating "demographic changes-of the ast century make it difficult to speak
of an average American family." A review of state non-parental
visitation statutes revealed that states have recognized that children.should
have "the opportunity to benefit from relationships with statutorily
specified persons" 49 and that this recognition was like the one at issue in
the case. Those measures, she said, were largely a result of states'
recognizing that it benefits children to continue relationships with
grandparents and other family members in the household.o
Turning to the facts in Troxel, and the Washington statute
specifically, Justice O'Connor criticized the language of the statute as
"breathtakingly broad," 5 by allowing a judge's opinion to overturn a fit
parent's determination of whether it is in the "best interests" of her child
to have visitation with a third party.52 In Justice O'Connor's view, the
denial of a fit custodial parent's right to determine her child's best
46 Id. at 65 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)) (fundamental liberty
right to "establish a home and bring up children"); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534-35 (1925) (fundamental liberty right to "direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control"); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). In support
of its position that there is a fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning
the care, custody, and control of children, the Court relied on Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997), Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982), Parham v. JR,
442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979), Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978), Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972),
but in fact, only Glucksberg and Stanley contain a discussion of fundamental rights; the
other cases instead refer to the tradition and history of respecting parents and families.
Scharf, supra note 32.
47 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66.
48 Id. at 63-64.
49 Id. at 64.
50 Id.
5' Id. at 67.
52 Id.
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interests is precisely what occurred in Troxel.53 She further stated that the
statute "effectively permits any third party seeking visitation to subject
any decision by a parent concerning visitation of the parents' children to
state court review." 54 Further, Justice O'Connor noted that there were no
facts in evidence to justify the state's infringing on the mother's right to
bring up her children as she saw fit; moreover, the trial court failed to give
the mother's wishes regarding the children's visitation any special weight
at all, employing a pure best interests of the child standard.
The plurality opinion set forth three primary reasons in support of
its holding that the trial court's visitation order unconstitutionally
infringed on Granville's fundamental Due Process right to raise her
children as she saw fit. 56 First, the order cited no allegations or findings
that Granville was unfit. Therefore, under Supreme Court jurisprudence,57
the custodial mother was presumed to have acted in the best interests of
her children.58 Second, the trial court failed to give any "special weight at
all" to the mother's opinion as to what was best for her children vis-A-vis
visiting with their grandparents. 59 Third, the mother had never sought to
discontinue all of her children's visitation and contact with their
grandparents, but sought only to limit the amount of time her children
visited with them. 60 Justice O'Connor concluded her opinion by stating
that because they rested their decision on the "sweeping breadth" of the
statute and its application, they need not address the primary constitutional
question at issue, that is "whether the Due Process Clause requires all non-
parental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm
to the children as a condition precedent to granting visitation." 6 1
Dissenting, Justice Kennedy squarely addressed the question of
whether all non-parental visitation statutes were required to include such a
5 Id. at 68.
54 Id. at 67.
55 Id.
56 See Scharf, supra note 32, at 624 n.81.
57 See Parham v. J.R. 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (finding that a fit parent is presumed to
act in his or her child's best interests).
58 Id.
59 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69. Justice O'Connor goes even further and finds that the trial
court judge placed the burden of proving that visitation would not be in the best interests
of her children on Granville. Id. ("In effect, the judge placed on Granville, the fit
custodial parent, the burden of disproving that visitation would be in the best interest of
her daughters.").
60 See id. at 68-69.
61 Id. at 73.
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showing of harm.62 He criticized the Washington Supreme Court for
striking down the statute categorically because the statute lacked a
requirement that "harm to the child would result if visitation were
withheld,"63 finding this reasoning "too broad to be correct."" Instead, a
"best interests of the child standard" 65 should be applied in third party
visitation cases. 66 Additionally, Justice Kennedy opined that the plurality
opinion failed to adequately address recent changes in the nuclear family,
finding that Justice O'Connor's opinion assumed that the custodial parent
had been the primary caregiver, but that third parties did not have an
established relationship with the child.67 Furthermore, Justice Kennedy
recognized the importance of attachment and third party visitation:
Some pre-existing relationships, then, serve to
identify persons who have a strong attachment to the child
with the concomitant motivation to act in a responsible way
to ensure the child's welfare. As the State Supreme Court
was correct to acknowledge, those relationships can be so
enduring that 'in certain circumstances where a child has
enjoyed a substantial relationship with a third person,
arbitrarily depriving the child of the relationship could
cause severe psychological harm to the child. .. 68
Justice Stevens further argued in his dissenting opinion that a
parent's interests must be balanced against "the child's own
complementary interest in preserving relationships that serve her welfare
and protection."69 Moreover, he concluded that "the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment leaves room for States to consider the
62 Id. at 94-95.
63 Id. at 94 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
64Id.
65 See Janet L. Dolgin, Why Has the Best-Interest Standard Survived?: The Historic and
Social Context, 16 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 2, 2 n.l (1996) (describing how all fifty states,
either statutorily or judicially, require judges to apply a "best interest of the child"
standard when making custody determinations between legal parents); see also Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act § 402, 9A U.L.A. (Part 2) 282 (1998). But see Jon Ester,
Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. I (1987)
(criticizing the "best interest of the child" standard as too elusive and subjective).
66 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
67 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
68 Id. at 99 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 27
(Wash. 1998)).
69 Id. at 87 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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impact on a child of possibly arbitrary parental decisions that neither serve
nor are motivated by the best interest of the child." 70
Troxel's reasoning applies with equal force to adoptive parents.
Once an adoption is finalized, the adoptive parents acquire the same
fundamental rights in the care of the adopted child that a biological parent
has. In fact, the fundamental liberty interest in the "care, custody, and
control of their children" to which Troxel refers would arguably go into
effect only when an adoption is finalized and the adoptive parent assumes
the role of the legal parent.71 In Simmons v. Simmons, the Tennessee
Supreme Court considered the plaintiffs' claim that the adoptive parents'
right to raise their child was subject to a lesser Constitutional standard
than that of fit biological parents. The court rejected that argument and
ruled that "[t]he relationship between an adoptive parent and child is no
less sacred than the relationship between a natural parent and child, and
that relationship is entitled to the same legal protection." 72
While an adoptive parent may have such rights as a matter of state
law, the United States Supreme Court has never recognized a fundamental
right to adopt.73 Moreover, the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal that
have addressed the issue have explicitly found there is no fundamental
right to adopt.74 For example, in Mullins v. Oregon, the Ninth Circuit
found that "whatever claim a prospective adoptive parent may have to a
child, we are certain that it does not rise to the level of a fundamental
liberty interest."75 Similarly, in Lindley v. Sullivan, the Seventh Circuit
held that "we are constrained to conclude that there is no fundamental
right to adopt." 76
As preeminent family law scholar Solangel Maldonado suggests,
70 Id. at 91.
71 See In re Jamison, 4 N.E.3d 889, 901 (Mass. 2014) (declaring that an adoptive parent
obtains the same fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment as biological
parents, but legal guardians do not because "an adoption terminates the legal relationship
between a biological parent and a child and establishes in its stead a new legal
relationship between an adoptive parent and child").
72 Simmons v. Simmons, 900 S.W.2d 682, 684 (Tenn. 1995).
n Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Redefining the Transracial Adoption Controversy, 2 DuKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y, 131, 154 (1995) ("[A]lthough the Supreme Court has rendered
decisions defining various elements of family relationships as fundamental interests, none
of those cases announced a fundamental interest in adopting children.").
74 Mullins v. Oregon, 57 F.3d 789, 794 (9th Cir. 1995); Lindley v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d
124, 131 (7th Cir. 1989).
7 Mullins, 57 F.3d at 794.
7 Lindley, 889 F.2d at 131.
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[W]hile courts have recognized a fundamental right to
procreate, they have not recognized a fundamental right to
adopt. Courts must protect biological parents' fundamental
rights to raise their children and may not remove a child
from the care of his birth parents or terminate parental
rights merely because another set of parents would do a
better job of raising the child. Absent evidence of neglect
or abuse or evidence that the child is in imminent risk of
neglect or abuse, the state cannot terminate a parent's rights
simply because it believes it would be in the child's best
interests to be raised by another family. In contrast, when
placing a child for adoption, courts must be guided
exclusively by the child's best interests without regard for
the interests of the adoptive parents. 77
B. Statutory Authorization
States have struggled on the whole with how to approach third
party visitation statutes in a post-Troxel universe. While many states
repealed their third party visitation statutes entirely, some have moved in
the direction of creating some mechanism for third party visitation. In
doing so, they have faced a significant challenge in addressing the
Supreme Court's concerns delineated in Troxel v. Granville without clear
directives from the Court. Justice O'Connor made clear in the plurality
opinion that a statutory standard allowing a trial judge to apply a "best
interest of the child" standard without giving "special weight" to a fit
custodial parents' wishes would not meet Due Process requirements under
the United States Constitution.78 In the absence of guidance state
legislatures have been reluctant to allow post-adoption visitation between
biological and adoptive families without the adoptive parents' explicit
consent.
For states that have addressed the issue of post-adoption contact
through legislative enactment, there are generally two types of statutory
schemes. The first way states have regulated post-adoption contact
between biological and adoptive families is through statutes allowing for
post-adoption contact agreementS79 entered into by the birth and adoptive
n Solangel Maldonado, Permanency v. Biology: Making the Case for Post-Adoption
Contact, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 321, 357-58 (2008) [hereinafter Maldonado, Permanency v.
Biology].
78 See supra Part II.A.
79 For a more detailed discussion of post-adoption contact agreements, see infra Part
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families. Such statutes "enable birth relatives and adoptive parents to
enter into a post-adoption contact agreement prior to adoption that either
party can enforce or modify in a court of law after adoption, but which can
never provide grounds to set aside a voluntary relinquishment or an
adoption."8 1  Approximately twenty-five states and the District of
Columbia now have statutes that specifically permit written contact
agreements between birth parents and adoptive parents;82 most, however,
do not include or address birth siblings. This omission is particularly
poignant for children in the foster care system, many of whom have had
their birth parents' rights terminated, effectively prohibiting them from
V.A.
80 See Annette R. Appell, Controlling for Kin: Ghosts in the Postmodern Family, 25
Wis. J. L. GENDER & SOC'Y 73, 92, 93 n. 117-18 (2010) [hereinafter Appell, Controlling
for Kin]; Annette R. Appell, Enforceable Post Adoption Contact Statutes, Part II: Court-
Imposed Post Adoption Contact, 4:2 ADOPTION QUARTERLY 101, 101 (2000); see also
Annette R. Appell, Reflections on the Movement Toward a More Child-Centered
Adoption, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 27-32 (2010).
81 Annette R. Appell, Survey of State Utilization of Adoption with Contact, 6:4
ADOPTION QUARTERLY 75, 75 (2003) [hereinafter Appell, State Utilization of Adoption
with Contact].
82 See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-116.01 (1999); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5 (West 2004
& Supp. 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-715 (West 2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 929 (West 2013); D.C. CODE § 4-361 (2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.0427 (West 2012);
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-16-2 (West 2012); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1269.3 (2008);
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-308 (West 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 210, § 6C;
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.58 (West 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-5-301 (2007); NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-162 to -165 (LexisNexis 2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
127.187-127.1895 (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B14 (2014); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 32A-5-35 (West 2009); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 112-b (McKinney 2010); N.Y.
Soc. SERV. LAW § 383-c(2)(b) (McKinney 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-3-610
(West 1996); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7505-1.5 (West 2000); OR. REV. STAT. §
109.305 (2009); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2733, 2738 (WEST 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 15-7-14.1 (West 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 25-6-17 (2009) (2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 25-6-17 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 4-112 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-
1220.2 (West 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.295 (West 2009). Vermont,
however, limits them to stepparent adoptions. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 4-112.
Furthermore, many of the other state statutes are limited to situations where the birth
parent is a party to the contract and not when the child is in foster care and the birth
parents' rights have been terminated. CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN Svc., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMS., POSTADOPTION
CONTACT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN BIRTH AND ADOPTIVE FAMS.,
www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws-policies/statutes/cooperative.pdf *2 (May 2011)
[hereinafter CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, POSTADOPTION CONTACT
AGREEMENTS]. Connecticut and Nebraska, on the other hand, limit post-adoption contact
agreements to children who are adopted through foster care. Id. at 3.
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benefitting from a statute that is limited to contact with birth parents,
rather than other members of the birth family. 83
All but a handful of the post-adoption contact agreement statutes
contain certain common features. First, these statutes give courts authority
to grant an adoption with contact only when the adoptive parents agree to
it. 84 Those statutes instead apply only when the agreements are voluntarily
entered into, a situation that is not likely to occur when the adoptive
parents have no motivation to do so. Even the most well-intentioned
adoptive parents, sympathetic to an adopted foster child's desire to
maintain a relationship with his or her birth family, are likely to choose an
informal path to continuing those relationships, rather than to enter into a
court-enforceable agreement. Second, although there are differences
regarding who can be "parties to the adoption" in the post-adoption
contact agreement, 8 the statutes require that all parties to the agreement
must agree in writing to all terms prior to the finalization of the
adoption.86 Third, none of the statutes provide for vacating of the adoption
83 Rhode Island is one of the few exceptions. In Rhode Island, the statute specifically
states that adoption with contact can be available even when the termination of parental
rights is involuntary, so that it is not as coercive. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-7-14.1. The
change to the Rhode Island statute was made "so that birth parents would not forego the
right to a termination of parental rights trial at the risk of losing and subsequently being
statutorily precluded from participating in adoption with contact." Appell, State
Utilization of Adoption with Contact, supra note 81, at 75. According to law professor
Hillary Baldwin, who conducted a ten-year study of parental termination cases in Indiana,
many mothers accused of abuse and neglect, who faced involuntary termination of their
parental rights, voluntarily gave up their rights in exchange for an ability to enter into
some type of post-adoption contact agreement. Hillary Baldwin, Termination of Parental
Rights: Statistical Study and Proposed Solutions, 28 J. LEGIS. 239, 274 (2002)
("[V]oluntary termination gives the parent his only chance to work out a post-adoption
visitation agreement. If the termination proceeds involuntarily, the parent risks never
seeing the child again.").
84 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 6(c)(2008) ("[T]he court shall approve an
agreement for post-adoption contact or communication if the court finds that such
agreement is in the best interests of the child, contains terms that are fair and reasonable,
and has been entered knowingly and voluntarily by all parties to the agreement.").
85 CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, POSTADOPTION CONTACT AGREEMENTS,
supra note 82, at 3 ("The phrase 'parties to an adoption' generally refers to the birth
parents (or other person placing the child for adoption) and the adoptive parents; it may
include the adoptive child under the laws of some States."). In instances where the
adoptive child is a party to the agreement, some states have provided for a guardian ad
litem to represent the child's interests. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2733(b) (for
siblings in foster care where "the prospective adoptive parent is not adopting all of the
siblings, each such sibling who is under 18 years of age shall be represented by a
guardian ad litem in the development of an agreement").
86 CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, POSTADOPTION CONTACT AGREEMENTS,
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or rescission of voluntary termination of parental rights as a remedy for
breach of the agreement. 87
The second way states have regulated post-adoption contact
between biological and adoptive families is through statutes that permit
courts themselves to order post-adoption contact; these statutes are
typically silent as to post-adoption contact agreements, although they too
require the consent of the adopting party. These statutes "empower the
court to maintain pre-adoptive visitation rights after adoption or order
post-adoption contact."88 Colorado law, for example, provides that
"[i]n cases involving the adoption of a child who is
part of a sibling group, but who is not being adopted with
his or her siblings, in addition to issuing a final decree of
adoption, if the adoptive parents are willing, the court may
encourage reasonable visitation among the siblings when
visitation is in the best interests of the child."89
Indiana allows a court to issue an order for post-adoption sibling
contact if the adopted child is at least two years old and "(1) the court
determines that the postadoption contact would serve the best interests of
the adopted child; and (2) each adoptive parent consents to the court's
order for postadoption contact privileges." 90
While not dispensing with the consent of the adoptive parents, a
few states have moved toward doing more to encourage adoptive parents
to consent. In Pennsylvania, for example, the child welfare agency is
required to notify the prospective adoptive parents, the birth parents, and
the child that there is the option of voluntarily entering into a post-
adoption visitation agreement with birth relatives, including siblings.9 1
The Colorado statute specifies that the court "shall review the record and
inquire as to whether the adoptive parents have received counseling
regarding children in sibling groups maintaining or developing ties with
each other."92 So too, Massachusetts statutory and case law allows for
courts to ensure that "sibling visitation rights be implemented through a
supra note 82, at 4.
8 Appell, State Utilization of Adoption with Contact, supra note 81, at 77. The Rhode
Island statute applies to children who demonstrate specific attachments to their birth
parents and-also allows it when termination is involuntary. R.I. GEN. ANN. LAWS § 15-7-
14.1.
88 Appell, Controlling for Kin, supra note 80, at 92.
89 COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-210 (7) (2012) (emphasis added).
90 IND. CODE § 31-19-16.5 (1) (2012).
91 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2733(c).
92 COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-210(7).
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schedule of visitation or supervised visitations" when it is in the best
interests of the child, and the adoptive parents consent. 93
Of the remaining states, most do not statutorily address the issue of
post-adoption contact with birth families at all. A few, however, explicitly
state that "open adoptions" are not legally recognized. Ohio law, for
example, specifies that open adoptions are not binding or enforceable. 94
Moreover, finding that "[p]ost-adoption visitation is an extraordinary
remedy,"95 the South Dakota legislature specifically abrogated the South
Dakota Supreme Court decision, People in Interest of S.A.H., 9 6 "insofar as
the case gave circuit courts the option to order an open adoption or post-
termination visitation." 97 Such a wide divergence in the treatment of open
adoptions and post-adoption contact by states mirrors the ambivalence of
the public over the last century as the American adoption paradigm has
undergone radical changes.
III. Movement from Closed to Open Adoptions
A. History of Closed Adoptions
Adoption was not recognized at common law and is purely a
statutory creation. 98 In fact, in the post-Revolutionary War era, adoptions
were legalized only through "individualized legislative enactments." 99
9 Massachusetts is one of the few states that allows siblings to request visitation: "[a]ny
child over 12 years of age may request visitation with siblings who have been separated
and placed in care or have been adopted in a foster or adoptive home other than where the
child resides." MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 19, § 26B; see also In re Adoption of Zander, 983
N.E.2d 1222, 1226 (Mass. 2013).
94 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.65 (West 1996); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-760
(D) (West 2008) (A post-adoption contact agreement "does not preserve any parental
rights with the biological parents and does not give them any rights enforceable in the
courts of this State.").
95 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-17 (1997).
96 People in Interest of S.A.H., 537 N.W.2d I (S.D. 1995), overturned by legislative
enactment, An Act to Prohibit Conditional Adoptions, 1997 S.D. Sess. Laws 153
(codified by S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-17).
97 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-17.
98 English common law did not provide for adoptions, and adoption legislation was not
passed in England until 1926. H. DAVID KIRK, ADOPTIVE KINSHIP xiv (1981); Stephen B.
Presser, The Historical Background of the American Law of Adoption, in II J. FAM. L.
443, 465 (1971). Massachusetts enacted the first adoption statute in the United States in
1851. Act of May 24, 1851, ch. 324, 1851 Mass. Acts 104; see also KIRK, supra at 71.
The purpose behind the initial state adoption statutes was to create a mechanism for
adoptive children to inherit from their adoptive parents. WILLIAM H. WHITMORE, THE
LAW OF ADOPTION iii-iv (Albany, Joel Munsell 1876).
99 Annette R. Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption: Implications for
100 Vol. I19: 1
Separated At Adoption
Such legislative enactments served to recognize the circumstances of a
particular family, but no statutory construct governed adoption until
Massachusetts passed the first statewide adoption statute in 1851.100 Many
other states soon followed the Massachusetts model.10 1
The concept of "open adoptions," that is, adoptions "which involve
direct communication and full disclosure of identifying information
between adoptive and birth families,"1 02 may seem at first blush to be a
modem convention. However, the enactment of the initial adoption
statutes in the United States did nothing to "close adoptions"; for example,
those statutes did not preserve confidentiality or seal adoption records.' 03
It was not until the first decades of the twentieth century, during World
War I, that the concept of legal "closed" adoptionl04 was recognized. os
Adoption became confidential after World War I "in response to an
increase in infant adoptions that was . . . spurred by many forces,
including a growth in infertility, the availability of more .reliable infant
formula, and the changing psychological theories that began to view
environment as more important in child development than genes."' 06 Once
Collaborative Adoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U. L. REV. 997, 1004 (1995) [hereinafter
Appell, Blending Families]; Presser, supra note 98, at 461-70.
100 Whitmore, supra note 98, at iii; see also Presser, supra note 98, at 465.
101 Presser, supra note 98, at 443; Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing?
52 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1102-54 (2003); see also KIRK, supra note 98, at 71.
102 HAROLD D. GROTEVANT & RUTH G. McRoY, OPENNESS IN ADOPTION: EXPLORING
FAMILY CONNECTIONS 3 (1998).
103 Joan H. Hollinger, Aftermath of Adoption: Legal and Social Consequences, in 3
ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE 13-1, 13-5 n.6 (Joan Heifetz Hollinger ed., 2007)
[hereinafter Hollinger, Aftermath ofAdoption].
104 "Closed adoptions," also referred to as "confidential adoptions," whereby "minimal
information is shared between adoptive and birthfamily members and is never transmitted
directly." GROTEVANT & McRoY, supra note 102, at 2-3 (explaining that with closed
adoptions, after most adoptions were completed, the files were closed, and "no further
contact was made between birth parents and adoptive family; all information about the
adoption was kept confidential by the adoption agency or the state").
105 Although the state of Minnesota passed the first law "closing" adoption in 1917, by
the 1930's almost all states had statutes mandating that legal adoptions be "confidential."
Lois R. MELINA & SHARON K. ROSzIA, THE OPEN ADOPTION EXPERIENCE 4 (1993); but
see Carol Amadio & Stuart L. Deutsch, Open Adoption: Allowing Adopted Children to
Stay in Touch with Blood Relatives, 22 J. FAM. L. 59, 65 (1983-84) (discussing how
couples cared for unwed pregnant women in the pre-World War 11 rural United States,
adopted their children and kept an ongoing relationship with the biological mothers post-
adoption).
106 Appell, Controlling for Kin, supra note 80, at 88.
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the concept of "closed adoption" was introduced, it predominated the
remainder of the twentieth century.' 0 7
While at the advent of the twentieth century most state adoption
laws were silent as to confidentiality, by the mid-twentieth century, it was
the norm for state adoption statutes to contain provisions mandating
confidentiality. 0 8 The purpose behind those adoption statutes was "to
effectuate a complete substitution of the adoptive family for the natural in
every respect except the biological." 09 Moreover, the "adoption
paradigm" that prevailed throughout the twentieth century was "one of
exclusivity, secrecy, and transposition, through which the adoptee-
usually an infant-is taken from one family and given to another, with all
vestiges of the first family removed.""l0 In the paradigm of closed
adoption,
all actual contact, as well as legal relationships,
between child and biological family are severed completely
and permanently, with the expectation that the child will
develop primary emotional attachments exclusively within
the adoptive family. With the approval and support of the
adoptive family, the child will begin anew to form
relationships with others in the course of normal social
growth. In the closed adoption, the adoptive family replaces
the biological family.'
The closed adoption necessitated "a series of secrets designed to
support this fictional rebirth."ll 2 Moreover, the adoption records were
107 See KIRK, supra note 98, at 99.
108 See Hollinger, Aftermath of Adoption, supra note 103, at 13-6. Hollinger also posits
that it was a desire to avoid the stigma of illegitimacy that was behind the movement
toward confidential records in adoption. Id. at 13-5 (discussing how the New York
adoption law mandated "that the 'fact of illegitimacy' not appear in the transcript of the
[adoption] proceedings").
109 Robert Borgman, The Consequences of Open and Closed Adoption for Older
Children, 61 CHILD WELFARE 217, 218 (1982) (quoting ROBERT LEE, 3 N.C. FAM. LAW
214 (The Michie Co. 1963)) [hereinafter Borgman, Open and Closed Adoption].
110 Appell, Blending Families, supra note 99, at 1005 (including references to history of
development of adoption in the twentieth century); see also Carl Schoenberg, On
Adoption and Identity, 53 CHILD WELFARE 549 (1974) ("The philosophy, legalities, and
practice of adoption in the U.S. have historically been based on the availability of babies
young enough and sufficiently like their adoptive parents to enable complete new
families to come into existence.").
111 Borgman, Open and Closed Adoption, supra note 109, at 218.
112 Appell, Blending Families, supra note 99, at 1007; see also LEE, supra note 109
("The adopted child is brought into the family of his adoptive parents as completely as by
the process of birth.").
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sealed with almost no possibility of access to names of all parties.113 The
child was given a new birth certificate with a new name and no reference
to the adoption,"l4 as if the original birth had never happened. But why
blanket the adoption in secrecy? Traditionally, it was said to protect all
members from the "shame" that shrouded the entire transaction: the
adoptive parents' shame of infertility;"' 5 the birth mother's shame of
having an "out-of wedlock" pregnancy; 116 and the child's shame of having
been relinquished by the birth parent.11 7 A further purported reason for the
secrecy was that "it facilitated the formation of the adoptive family by
excluding the birth parents while the adoptive parents and adoptee began
to develop emotional and psychological bonds.""' 8 Toward the end of the
113 Hollinger, Aftermath of Adoption, supra note 103, at 13-3 ("Once the adoption is
granted, the records of the proceeding, along with the investigative reports on the parties,
are sealed and are generally not available for inspection by anyone except upon court
order for 'good cause.' "); see also Appell, Blending Families, supra note 99, at 1008
("Whatever its claimed purpose, the sealing of records has become a cornerstone of
modern adoption and serves to reinforce the notion that adoptive parents are the exclusive
parents of the child."); Borgman, Open and Closed Adoption, supra note 109 (explaining
how closed adoptions were "buttressed by the sealed adoption record that serves as a
barrier to contact between children and their biological families").
114 Appell, Blending Families, supra note 99, at 1007 n.40 ("[A]doption statutes
generally mandate the issuance of a new birth certificate, identical to the original, except
for the substitution of the names of the adoptive parents for the names of the birth
parents."); see also MIRIAM REITZ & KENNETH W. WATSON, ADOPTION AND THE FAMILY
SYSTEM 5 (1992) (explaining that "in most jurisdictions, a new birth certificate is issued
giving the adoptive parents as the child's parents"); Elizabeth J. Samuels, The Idea of
Adoption: An Inquiry into the History of Adult Adoptee Access to Birth Records, 53
RUTGERS L. REV. 367, 376-78 (2001) (describing how, beginning in 1930, states began
the practice of replacing the names of the biological parents with those of the adoptive
parents). In 1941, the U.S. Children's Bureau officially sanctioned the practice of issuing
new birth certificates where the adoptive parents were listed as the actual birth parents,
"on part so the children could avoid the embarrassment of explaining why their parents'
names differed from those on their original birth certificates." Elizabeth J. Samuels, The
Strange History of Adult Adoptee Access to Original Birth Records, 5-2 ADOPTION
QUARTERLY 63, 74 (2001).
115 ARTHUR D. SOROSKY, ANNETTE BARAN & REUBEN PANNOR, THE ADOPTION
TRIANGLE 74 (1978).
116 MELINA & ROSZIA, supra note 105, at 9.
117 Burton Z. Sokoloff, Antecedents of American Adoption, in 3 ADOPTION 17, 22
(Spring 1993).
118 Appell, Blending Families, supra note 99, at 1007; see also Hollinger, Aftermath of
Adoption, supra note 103, at 13-8 ("[C]omplete severance of all ties between biological
parents and the adoptee facilitates the development of strong emotional attachments
between the adoptive parents and the adoptee, and insulates the adoptive families against
interference in their lives by members of the child's family."). But see Appell, Blending
Families, supra note 99, 1015 n.91 (suggesting that "[t]hose concerned that contact with
the birth family will inhibit the adoption attachment or claiming process should consider
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twentieth century, however, due to a confluence of normative changes,
and groundbreaking psychological research, the adoption paradigm began
to shift.
B. Movement Toward a More Open Model ofAdoption
In the last three decades of the twentieth century, the nature of
closed adoption slowly began to change largely as a result of
demographics related to the decreased. availability of infants for
adoption,"l 9 and the "growing recognition of the negative impact of
secrecy." 20 The legalization of abortion, the increased availability of birth
control, and the lessening of the stigma of out-of-wedlock births all
contributed to a culture in which fewer infants were available for
adoption.121 At the same time, an increase in infertility among many
middle class couples who had delayed having children increased the
demand for infants to adopt.122 Consequently, birth mothers 2 3 who were
the inevitability of the enduring presence of the birth family in the adoptee's psyche").
119 The demographics of who the adoptive parents were changed as well. Up until the
second half of the twentieth century, most adoptions involved married, white, infertile
couples adopting newborns born to single, white women. SHARON VANDIVERE, KARIN
MALM, & LAURA RADEL, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ADOPTION USA: A
CHARTBOOK BASED ON THE 2007 SURVEY OF ADOPTIVE PARENTS (2009), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/09/NSAP/chartbook/index.pdf. This group still comprises the
majority of adoptive parents; by the end of the twentieth century, however, "a much
wider range of adults [sought] to build families through adoption-for example, fertile
couples, (with or without biological children of their own), minority couples, single
adults, foster parents, and working class couples." DAVID M. BRODZINSKY & MARSHALL
D. SCHECTER, Preface to THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION xi (Brodzinsky and Schecter
eds., 1990).
120 DEBORAH H. SIEGEL & SUSAN LIVINGSTON SMITH, EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION
INST. 7 (March 2012), available at
http://adoptioninstitute.org/old/publications/2012_03_OpennessnAdoption.pdf.
121 Carol Sanger, Bargaining for Motherhood: Postadoption Visitation Agreements, 41
HOFSTRA L. REv. 309, 314 (2012); see also Appell, Blending Families, supra note 99, at
1008; see also Nicholas Zill, Benefits and Challenges of Adopting Children from Foster
Care: Insight from a National Survey of Children's Health, in ADOPTION FACTBOOK V
213, 213 (Elisa S. Rosman et al. eds., 2011) (adding that "teen mothers, the age group
historically most likely to place their infants for adoption, have become less common
since 1970"). There was also an increase in the number of step-parent adoptions that
corresponded to the rise in divorce rates, which began in the early 1970s. SOROSKY ET
AL.,supra note 115, at 197.
122 Sokoloff, supra note 117, at 23; Nicholas Zill, Benefits and Challenges, supra note
121. "According to the National Adoption Information Clearinghouse estimate, less than
14,000 children were voluntarily relinquished for adoption in the United States in 2003,
and in 1995, the number of American women seeking to adopt was over 200,000." CHILD
WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN Svcs., ADMIN. FOR
CHILDREN AND FAMS., VOLUNTARY RELINQUISHMENT FOR ADOPTION 1 (2005), available
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giving up their children for adoption slowly gained the power to exert
more control over the adoption process. 124 They became empowered to
request ongoing contact with the child and adoptive parents and to choose
among adoptive parents who were willing to agree to such continued
contact.
Professor Annette Appell explains the increase in the.openness of
adoption as follows:
[B]irth mothers have gained more autonomy through
increased reproductive choice and changing legal and
social mores that produce less shame in the tangible
incarnations of women's sexuality. Armed with this moral
authority, birth mothers began to seek adoptive parents who
would be willing to engage in open adoption in which birth
parents meet each other and might even have open
contact. 125
As birth mothers sought more openness in adoptions, pressure
mounted on adoptive parents to agree to open adoptions even beyond their
comfort level, in order to adopt the child.126 In open adoptions, the
adoptive parents acquire legal rights and responsibilities as parents and are
responsible for the day-to-day care of the child; however, contact between
the adopted child and the biological family is permitted and, at times, even
encouraged.127 Open adoption pioneers Annette Baran, Reuben Pannor,
and Arthur Sorosky define open adoption as "[an adoption] in which the
birth parents meet the adoptive parents, participate in the separation and
at http://childwelfare.gov/pubs/s place.pdf.
123 1 use the term "birth mother" throughout although there are, of course, instances
when there are "birth parents" who make the determination to relinquish a child for
adoption.
124 Such "control" has manifested itself primarily by often allowing the birth mothers to
choose the adoptive parents by reading statements or biographies, or by reviewing
medical records. For a discussion of the "changes in the face of adoption" see Appell,
Blending Families, supra note 99, at 1007, and Sokoloff, supra note 117, at 22-23.
125 Appell, Controlling for Kin, supra note 80, at 91.
126 Kirsten Widner, Continuing the Evolution: Why California Should Amend Family
Code Section 8616.5 to Allow Visitation in All Postadoption Contact Agreements, 44 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 355, 358 (2007) (citing Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging
Rights of Adoptive Parents: Substance or Specter?, 38 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 917, 917-22
(1991)) (arguing that because there are fewer adoptable infants, adoption is now a
''provider's market" and birth mothers can "dictate whimsical requirements for the
adoptive home").
127 Borgman, Open and Closed Adoption, supra note 109 (describing how, with open
adoptions, "the adoptive family expands the child's range of relationships").
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placement process, relinquish all legal, moral, and nurturing rights to the
child, but retain the right to continuing contact and to knowledge of the
child's whereabouts and welfare."1 28 In fact, open adoption takes place on
a spectrum with the mere exchange of information about the birth parents
and adoptive parents at one end of the continuum and "full family
interrelationships with shared space and shared parenting"l9 at the other,
and a wide variety of levels of communications in between.1
30
The movement toward open adoption brought with it debate about
the "detrimental or beneficial effects of openness in adoption."' 3 '
Advocates of open adoption claim that adoptive parents are helped "by
having permission to parent from their child's birth parents." 32 Open
adoption can also arguably assist birth parents because "trust is built
between birth and adoptive parents" and birth parents are reassured of
their decision to place the child. 133 Moreover, many argue that "as adopted
children grow up into adulthood, the secrecy surrounding their past can be
more of a hindrance than a help to many of them."' 34 Conversely,
opponents of open adoption posit that in open adoptions, adoptive parents
lack the necessary security in their role as parents, and birth parents are
"unable to 'move on' with their lives."' 3 5
128 Annette Baran, Reuben Pannor, & Arthur Sorosky, Open Adoption, in Soc. WORK
97, 97 (Mar. 1976) ("There is no sound reason to continue in the belief that biological
parents be banished, or that a child's emotional connections with biological parents
preclude the creation of healthy and stable placements.").
129 Appell, Controlling for Kin, supra note 80.
130 Chris Jones & Simon Hackett, Communicative Openness Within Adoptive Families:
Adoptive Parents' Narrative Accounts of the Challenges of Adoption Talk and the
Approaches Used to Manage These Challenges, ADOPTION Q. 157, 158-59 (2007)
(describing a variety of medium whereby post-adoption contact between birth families
and adoptive families is maintained, including handwritten, electronic, and telephonic).
131 David M. Martin et al., Toward a Greater Understanding of Openness: A Report
from the Early Growth and Development Study, ADOPTION FACTBOOK V 471, 471 (Elisa
Rosman et al. eds., 2011); see also Charlene E. Miall & Karen March, Open Adoption as
a Family Form: Community Assessments and Social Support, in 26 J. FAM. ISSUES 380-
410 (2005).
132 Martin, supra note 131.
11 Id. at 471 n.7.
134 KIRK, supra note 98, at 22. As a result of the secrecy, adopted children developed
fears and fantasies about their origins. Miriam Reitz and Kenneth W. Watson conducted
studies of adoptees and adoptive families and found the "origin" stories of adoptees
focused on three reasons that their birth families did not raise them: (1) there was
something wrong with the adoptee herself and therefore their birth family did not want to
keep them; (2) there was something wrong with their birth parents; and (3) their adoptive
parents kidnapped them from their birth parents. Reitz & Watson, supra note I14, at 8-9.
135 Martin, supra note 131, at 471 n.5; see also Adrienne D. Kraft et al., Some
Vol. I19: 1106
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The demographics of adoption, however, continue to change.
Many more children who are adopted do so from foster care and are
adopted at a later age.1 36 Given their older ages, there is little doubt that
they have knowledge of their birth families, and for these children a truly
"closed adoption" is merely a pretense. Thus, the question becomes what
is sound public policy for addressing the needs of those children who are
adopted but have palpable connections to their birth families.
IV. The Psychology of Sibling Relationships
A. Sibling Attachment Bonds
For many children, the bond they share with a sibling1 37 will be
one of the strongest they experience during their lifetime; often, sibling
"relationships and identities are intertwined, sometimes for life."1 38 This
bond is a result of a "closeness that comes from being the only people who
know what it was like to grow up in their families. This sense of shared
memories and shared experience often keeps siblings close long into
adulthood." 39 As Stephen Bank and Michael Kahn explain in their
seminal work, Sibling Bond, "[t]he sibling bond is often experienced like
this-viscerally, forcefully, without conscious understanding, but with a
sixth sense that this relationship is a vital key to one's own knowledge of
oneself. One's core self, seen through the eyes of a sibling, or compared
with that of a sibling, remains [an] essential reference point for personal
identity."l40 Not surprisingly, the warmth resulting from a strong sibling
Theoretical Considerations on Confidential Adoptions (pts. 1-3) 2 CHILD AND
ADOLESCENT Soc. WORK J. 13, 69, 139-40 (1985) (discussing the effect of open
adoptions on the adopted child, the adopted parent, and the birth mother). Even as the
number of open adoptions increases and has become a common practice among domestic
adoptions in this country, public attitudes toward open adoption have lagged behind. For
example, one of the first national surveys regarding public attitudes toward adoption,
conducted by the Adoption Institute in 2007, found "considerable ambivalence in the
general public toward even a moderate level of openness." Siegel & Livingston Smith,
supra note 120, at 5-6.
136 See Hollinger, Introduction to Adoption Law and Practice, and accompanying text,
infra note 179.
137 Eighty percent of children in the United States have at least one sibling. Angela N.
Hilton & Dawn M. Szymanski, Family Dynamics and Changes in Sibling of Origin
Relationships After Lesbian and Gay Sexual Orientation Disclosure, 33 CONTEMP. FAM.
THERAPY 291, 293 (2011).
138 STEPHEN BANK & MICHAEL D. KAHN, THE SIBLING BOND 112 (1982).
139 MELINA & ROszIA, supra note 105, at 288 ("Not surprisingly, siblings who see each
other often will probably feel closer to each other than those who must build their
relationship through an occasional long-distance phone call.").140 BANK & KAHN, supra note 138, at 60. This is not to say that all sibling bonds are
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bond is associated with individuals experiencing less loneliness, fewer
behavior difficulties, and higher self-worth.14 1
When parents are consistently physically and emotionally
unavailable, as is the case for many children who eventually find their way
into foster care, siblings are even more likely to form a strong bond with
each other.142 That is, sibling attachment bonds are strengthened when a
parent is repeatedly "unresponsive or is ineffective in meeting the child's
needs (as in the case of alcoholic, drug-addicted, or mentally unstable
parents .. . y"143 Thus, children whose family lives are deeply troubled and
who lose daily contact with even one of their parents often form deeper
attachments to their siblings; 144 those siblings then become "attachment
figures" in their lives. 14
An individual becomes an attachment figurel 46 for a child when
she has established a bond that is a "relatively long-enduring tie in which
created equal. Siblings may also have "low access," such as when they are very far apart
in age, and thus "lack the sense of a shared history." Id. at 10. "The strength of the sibling
bond depends partially on 'access.' When siblings are the same gender, close in age,
share a room, raised by the same parent(s), attend the same schools, they are 'high
access' siblings and 'a strong and influential tie will develop between them.'" Marrus,
Where Have You Been Fran?, supra note 5, at 984.
141 Clare M. Stocker, Children's Perceptions of Relationships with Siblings, Friends,
and Mothers: Compensatory Processes and Links with Adjustment, in 35 J. CHILD
PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 1447, 1454-55 (1994).
142 See BANK & KAHN, supra note 138, at 64, 123. Moreover, a number of psychological
studies have concluded that parental under-involvement results in strong loyalty between
siblings. JAMES H.S. BOSSARD, & ELEANOR S. NOLL, THE LARGE FAMILY SYSTEM: AN
ORIGINAL STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF FAMILY BEHAVIOR. (1956); Brian Sutton-Smith
et al., The Interaction of Father Absence and Sibling Presence on Cognitive Abilities, in
39 CHILD DEV. 1213-21 (1968).
143 Marrus, Where Have You Been, Fran?, supra note 5, at 986 (citing Cicirelli, supra
note 145, at 111).
144 See Katherine Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for
Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV.
879, 881 (1984) (citing Looper v. McManus, 581 P.2d 487, 488-89 (Okla. Ct. App.
1978)); see also BANK & KAHN, supra note 138, at 31 ("[I]f a [parent] is available and
competent, siblings are unlikely to become figures for symbiosis and attachment for each
other.").
145 Although for most children, the first attachment bond they experience is with a
parent, children also form attachment bonds with siblings and other close family
members. See VICTOR G. CICIRELLI, SIBLING RELATIONSHIPS ACROSS THE LIFE SPAN 43
(1995); see also Tiffany Field, Attachment and Separation in Young Children, 47 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 541, 544 (1996). Furthermore, studies have shown that children can
develop strong sibling attachments even as infants. CICIRELLI, supra; Field, supra.
146 According to John Bowlby, "[a]n attachment figure [is] any person perceived as
stronger and better able to cope with the world and someone who provides consistent
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the [family member] is important as a unique individual, interchangeable
with none other,"1 47 demonstrating "a need to maintain proximity, distress
upon inexplicable separation, pleasure or joy upon reunion, and grief and
loss."l 48 In fact, researchers have found, that attachment bonds formed
"between siblings can ease the separation from caregivers and can make
separation from [the other sibling] very stressful." 4 9 Moreover, in many
dysfunctional families, siblings provide the "only constancy and stability
in their lives. Sometimes, siblings even help one another survive."150
As Bank and Kahn explain,
Psychotherapists meet many [siblings] who have no loving
or sustaining parent at home, and for whom, thus
abandoned, the sibling relationship is the only caring force.
These siblings' relationships and identities are
intertwined ... because they have jointly faced traumatic
psychological losses at crucial stages of their development.
Mutual loyalty and caregiving for these real-life Hansels
and Gretels permit both physical and psychological
survival. 151
protection and care." Shelley A. Riggs, RESPONSE TO TROXEL V. GRANVILLE:
Implications of Attachment Theory for Judicial Decisions Regarding Custody and Third-
Party Visitation, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 39, 43 (2003) (citing JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT
AND LoSS: VOL. 3. Loss (1980)).
147 Riggs, supra note 146, at 40-4 1.
148 Id. at 43. Moreover, empirical evidence demonstrates that alternative (meaning "other
than natural parent") attachments can have a significant positive effect on a child's
socioemotional development. These attachments, which include attachments to siblings,
have increased importance during and after a divorce, for example, when natural parents
are often distracted by the tumult in their own lives and are unable to adequately tend to
the needs of their children, who may be experiencing tremendous loss at the changes
taking place in their lives. Id. at 44; see also E. Mavis Hetherington, T.C. Law & Thomas
G. O'Connor, Divorce: Challenges, Changes and New Chances, in NORMAL FAMILY
PROCESSES 208-34 (F. Walsh ed., 1993).
149 Marrus, Where Have You Been, Fran?, supra note 5, at 979 n.16; see also BANK &
KAHN, supra note 138, at 29 (recounting the story of a nineteen month-old infant who
suffered no noticeable difficulties when separated from her mother and placed, along
with her two older siblings, in the care of her aunt; when she later moved to another
relative's home without her siblings, she stopped eating, stopped talking, became
"withdrawn and agitated" and "resisted the affections of anyone, including the mother
and father when she was reunited with them," until she was reunited with her siblings).
150 Adam Pertman, Foreward to SIBLINGS IN ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE, xi (Deborah
N. Silverstein & Susan Livingston Smith eds., 2009).
'. BANK & KAHN, supra note 138, at 112-13.
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The attachment ties between biological siblings in foster carel52
are particularly strong.153 Nationally, there are approximately 399,500
children in foster care, with only 28% of those children being cared by a
foster parent who is a relative.154 Often children "deprived of parents form
a subfamily, with one child assuming the parental responsibility for
another. Consequently, the ties between siblings are often even stronger
than the ties of the children to their biological parents."'5 5 Those ties
between those children grow even stronger once they are in foster care.15 6
B. The Psychology of Sibling Loss Through Adoption
It is generally undisputed among psychologists that all adopted
children experience some degree of loss when adopted. 1s7 Although a
child's experience of loss is certainly not limited to adoption,' 5 8 adoption
152 One of the major sea changes of the last decades of the twentieth century has been
the tremendous increase in the number of children in the foster care system. In 2006,
approximately fifty thousand children in foster care were adopted. ADMIN. FOR
CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., AFCARS
REPORT: PRELIMINARY FY 2006 ESTIMATES AS OF JAN. 2008 (14), at 4, available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreportl4.pdf. Less than three percent
of these children were under the age of one. Id. at 7. For additional data on children in
foster care and adoption, see CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN Svcs., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMS., FOSTER CARE
STATISTICS 2012, 1-6 (Nov. 2013),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/foster.pdf [hereinafter, CHILD WELFARE
INFORMATION GATEWAY, FOSTER CARE STATISTICS]; see also Nicholas Zill, Benefits and
Challenges, supra note 121.
15 Pertman, supra note 150.
154 CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, FOSTER CARE STATISTICS, supra note
152, at 1, 3-4. As of September 2012, nationally there were 399, 546 children in foster
care. 47% were in nonrelative foster family homes, 28% in relative foster family homes,
9% in institutions, 6% in group homes, 6% on "trial home visits," and 6% in a variety of
other arrangements. Id.
1 CLAUDIA L. JEWETr, ADOPTING THE OLDER CHILD 161 (1978).
156 Id.
157 See David M. Brodzinsky, Adjustment to Adoption: A Psychosocial Perspective, in 7
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REv. 25, 36 (1987) [hereinafter Brodzinsky, Adoption: A
Psychosocial Perspective]; Steven L. Nickman, Losses in Adoption: The Need for
Dialogue, 40 THE PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD 365-98 (1985); Paul M.
Brinish, Some Potential Effects of Adoption on Self and Object Representations, 35 THE
PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD 107-33 (1980).
158 David M. Brodzinsky, A Stress and Coping Model of Adoption Adjustment, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION 3, 7 (David M. Brodzinsky and Marshall D. Schecter eds.,
1990) [hereinafter Brodzinsky, Model ofAdoption Adjustment] (explaining that "loss has
been conceptualized as a fundamental explanatory construct in children's adjustment to
many forms of family disruption and life transitions."). Moreover, "loss associated with
family disruption and life transitions varies along a number of dimensions, including
110 Vol. 119: 1
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loss is unique in several critical ways. The loss an adopted child
experiences is 'more pervasive, less socially recognized, and more
profound' than other family losses, such as those associated with
divorce.1 59 Adoption expert and scholar David M. Brozinsky has observed
that,
[a]lthough adoption, divorce, and death all involve loss, the
extent of the loss is greater in adoption .... In adoption, the
loss is more pervasive, although perhaps less obvious. Not
only do adopted children experience the loss of birth
parents and the extended birth family as well as the loss of
cultural and genealogical heritage, but for many adoptees
there is a loss of a sense of permanence in, and
connectedness to, their adoptive family, as well as a loss of
self and social status.' 60
Children who are adopted can even experience loss for biological
family members they have never known.161 In fact, "[t]he only certain
commonality among .. . families [connected through adoption] is that they
have undergone fundamental loss experiences beyond those that any
family can normally expect." 62 The scholarship on attachment and
children demonstrates that "[c]hildren separated from brothers and sisters
may never resolve their feelings of loss, even if there are new brothers and
sisters whom they grow to love."l 63 The loss of-or sudden, long-term
separation from-an attachment figure creates significant psychological
harm in children 64 and can "seriously injure and fragment an individual's
degree of acuteness, pervasiveness, permanence, universality, [and] public recognition of
loss." Id. at 8.
' DAVID M. BRODZINSKY, MARSHALL D. SCHECTER & ROBIN MARANTZ HENIG, BEING
ADOPTED: THE LIFELONG SEARCH FOR SELF 9 (1992); see also Brodzinsky, Adoption: A
Psychosocial Perspective, supra note 157, at 36-37.
160 Brodzinsky, Model ofAdoption Adjustment, supra note 158, at 9.
161 Id. at 7.
162 REITZ & WATSON, supra note 114, at 13; see also Anne B. Brodzinsky, Surrendering
an Infant for Adoption: The Birthmother Experience, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION
295, 304 (David M. Brodzinsky & Marshall D. Schecter eds. 1990). Moreover, there is
evidence that demonstrates that birth fathers experience a sense of loss as well, which can
result in feelings of anger and grief. VIVIAN B. SHAPIRO ET AL., COMPLEX ADOPTION AND
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 155 (2001); Brodzinsky, Model of Adoption
Adjustment, supra note 158, at 8 ("Adopted children also fantasize about 'undoing' their
loss.").
JEWETT, supra note 155, at 162.
164 BOWLBY, supra note 146.
111Winter 2015
UC Davis Journal ofJuvenile Law & Policy
sense of self."l 65 When siblings are separated at a young age, the bond is
often "disrupted before it begins to form."1 66 Moreover, multiple studies
have demonstrated that separating siblings can have "detrimental effects
on them, while maintaining their bonds can yield developmental, psychic,
and social benefits." 67 Nevertheless, some have argued that adopted
children will not be able to fully attach to their adoptive parents "until they
have relinquished attachments to others important to them in the past
through a process of mourning, protest, and acceptance of the loss."' 68
Because of the bonds children from disrupted families have
established with their biological siblings,169 a child's loss of her biological
siblings when adopted is particularly acute. Children who are old enough
to understand "may grieve for the loss of the brother or sister they will not
be living with."' 70 This grief is experienced "by first feeling numb and
denying the loss, by believing they caused the loss and trying to recover it
through some 'bargain,' by feeling angry and sad."' 7 1 The grieving
process for children who have lost a sibling to adoption is similar to that of
an adult, but also can involve both tremendous grief and a type of guilt.172
This is particularly true for older siblings whose younger siblings were
adopted. They may feel guilty, believing they should have "dropped out of
165 Riggs, supra note 146, at 41. "People with insecure attachment strategies may be at
greater risk for emotional problems due to distortions in their thinking and difficulties
regulating emotion." Id. (citing Elizabeth A. Carlson & L. Alan Sroufe, Contribution of
Attachment Theory to Developmental Psychopathology, in DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, VOL. 1: THEORY AND METHODS 581 (Dante Cicchetti & Donald J.
Cohen eds., 1995)).
166 Marrus, Where Have You Been, Fran?, supra note 5, 978 n.4 (citing SIBLING
RELATIONSHIPS: THEIR NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE ACROSS THE LIFESPAN 228 (Michael
E. Lamb & Brian Sutton-Smith eds., 1982)); Melina & Roszia, supra note 105, at 288
("Close relationships between birth siblings raised apart are also more common when a
child the birth parent is raising is old enough to remember the placement of the younger
sibling.").
167 Since the advent of open adoption, there has been an increase in studies looking at
the effect of terminating family bonds. Pertman, supra note 150, at ix.
168 Borgman, Open and Closed Adoption, supra note 109, at 219 (citing LAURIE
WISHARD & WILLIAM WISHARD, ADOPTION: THE GRAFTED TREE 52 (1979)); see also
ANN CARNEY, No MORE HERE AND THERE, 72-73 (1976) ("The genuine adoption will
more easily be effected once the child cuts all cords with the past, painful as this may
be.").
169 See supra Part IV.A.





school to get a job to help support"l 73 the sibling so that they would not
need to be permanently separated.
Creating an avenue for contact with children whose siblings are
adopted is critical to addressing the significant losses suffered by siblings.
Open adoption is particularly important for older adoptees who have a
need for "continuity as well as permanency." 74 Older children, in
particular, find it "extremely difficult, if not impossible, to suddenly erase
ten or more years of relationships, experience and family history without
endangering their basic security and self-identity."l 75 Moreover, access to
birth families, including siblings, can provide the adopted child with "a
more realistic view of his or her birth parents and relieve the child's guilt,
self-blame, and anger about placement and adoption." 76
In 1998, researchers Harold D. Grotevant and Ruth G. McRoy
conducted the Minnesota-Texas Research Project (MTARP), one of the
most comprehensive longitudinal studies involving adolescent adoptees
and their opinions on the openness of their adoptions.' 7 7 The MTARP
173 Id. According to adoption expert David M. Brodzinsky, "[fjantasies about reunions
with birthparents (and birthsiblings) are extremely common among adopted children as
they are growing up ... and may well serve to impede the resolution of loss among many
adopted individuals." Brodzinsky, Model ofAdoption Adjustment, supra note 158, at 7, 8;
see also BANK & KAHN, supra note 138, at 60 ("To meet one's brother or sister, even
after many years, is to recapture the bittersweet memory of one's own essential childhood
self, unmoved by the passage of time."). Moreover, "loss associated with family
disruption and life transitions varies along a number of dimensions, including degree of
acuteness, pervasiveness, permanence, universality, [and] public recognition of loss."
Brodzinsky, Model of Adoption Adjustment, supra note 158, at 7 (explaining that "loss
has been conceptualized as a fundamental explanatory construct in children's adjustment
to many forms of family disruption and life transitions.").
174 See Borgman, Open and Closed Adoption, supra note 109, at 217 (explaining that
"traditional closed adoption creates an artificial emotional circumstance for older children
who are asked to sever ties with meaningful persons"). Furthermore, "[s]ince the child
may remain involved with the biological family, he or she is spared the pain and guilt of
being forced to choose between the adoptive family and the biological parents and
relatives." Id. at 219.
17 Id.; see also Andre P. Derdeyn, Andrew R. Rogoff & Scott W. Williams, Alternatives
to Absolute Termination of Parental Rights After Long Term Foster Care, 31 VAND. L.
REV. 1165, 1189 (1978) ("There is no sound reason to continue in the belief that
[biological families] be banished, or that a child's emotional connections with [biological
families] preclude the creation of healthy and stable placements.").
176 Appell, Blending Families, supra note 99, at 1017 (citing Borgman, Open and Closed
Adoption, supra note 109, at 222-23).
177 See generally GROTEVANT & MCROY, supra note 102. Grotevant and McRoy's study
was commenced in 1987 with 190 adoptive families. All families had adopted newborns
through domestic adoption agencies in the United States. It is one of the only studies that
has conducted in-depth interviews of both birth and adoptive families across a period of
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studied the domestic adoptions of 190 adoptive families and 169 birth
mothers with "varying levels of openness" over a twenty-year period. As
part of the MTARP, over 150 adolescents who were adopted were
interviewed specifically regarding their feelings and satisfaction levels
surrounding the level of openness in their adoption. Those adolescents
who had contact with their birth families consistently were more satisfied
with the level of openness than those who did not, with almost all of the
teens interviewed wishing for even more extensive contact, including
contact with more family members of their family of origin.17 8
The MTARP findings take on particular significance when viewed
in light of present day adoptions. Today, most domestic adoptees are older
children, not the infants historically associated with adoption. 179 In fact, of
the 133,737 domestic adoptions in 2007, only 18,078, or 13.5 percent were
unrelated domestic adoptions of infants. 8 0 Therefore, the vast majority of
domestic adoptions are likely to involve children of an age when they have
developed a bond with a sibling.
When siblings are placed together, the adoption itself is less likely
to result in a disrupted placement.18' Placing siblings together can help
increase the likelihood the adoption will be successful. 182 In a review of
many years. SIEGEL & LIVINGSTON SMITH, supra note 120, at 16.
178 Jerica M. Berge et al., Adolescents' feelings about Openness in Adoption:
Implications for Adoption Agencies, 85 CHILD WELFARE 1011, 1039 (2006); Sacha
Coupet, Swimming Upstream Against the Great Adoption Tide: Making the Case for
"Impermanence", 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 405, 423 (2005) (quoting Robert Green, The
Evolution of Kinship Care Policy and Practice, in 14 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 131, 143
(Winter 2004) ("Research suggests that children in kinship foster care are more likely
than children in non-kin placements to be placed with siblings and 'more frequently
placed in close physical proximity to the homes from which they were removed.')).
179 Joan H. Hollinger, Introduction to Adoption Law and Practice, in 1 ADOPTION LAW
AND PRACTICE 1-56 (Joan Heifetz Hollinger ed., 2013). A little over twenty percent of
children adopted are infants who are adopted by non-relatives. Over half of adoptions are
by step-parents or other relatives, while another twenty percent are children who are in
foster care, who are rarely adopted as infants. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, Prefatory Note at 1
(1994).
1so Paul J. Placek, National Adoption Data Assembled by the National Council for
Adoption, in ADOPTION FACTBOOK V 3, 11 (Elisa S. Rosman et al. eds., 2011).
181 CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
Svcs., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMS., SIBLING ISSUES IN FOSTER CARE AND
ADOPTION 7 (Jan. 2013),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/siblingissues/siblingissues.pdf. For a discussion of
disruption in adoptions, see Robert Borgman, Antecedents and Consequences of Parental
Rights Termination for Abused and Neglected Children, 60 CHILD WELFARE 391, 391
(1981) [hereinafter Borgman, Parental Rights Termination].
182 See JEWETT, supra note 155, at 161-63.
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studies on "adoption disruption," that is, "the removal of a child from an
adoptive placement before the adoption has been legalized," 83 Trudy
Festinger determined that "siblings who were living together were less apt
to have problems of various sorts, which very likely was a factor in their
lower rate of disruption."' 84 Moreover, the children who had siblings in
other adoptive homes, but were separated from them, were
"overrepresented among disruptions."' Children adopted when they are
older have the most "impaired ability to attach" and are most likely to
have their adoptions disrupted.186 Given that adoptions in this country are
more likely to involve older children, it is even more important to look to
factors that will increase the likelihood of the success of the adoption.
Studies have shown that the older a child is when adopted, the more likely
the adoption is to be disrupted.187
Keeping siblings together or providing visitation can help both
younger and older children. It can relieve the sense of responsibility that
younger children often have for the breakup of the family. 88 And,
"[e]specially in the case of an older caretaker child who believes it was his
or her responsibility to hold the family together," 89 keeping siblings
together can alleviate other "deep feelings of guilt, failure, and
unworthiness." 90 Without post-adoptive contact, children who have been
in foster care can demonstrate reluctance to be adopted.' 9 ' As Robert
183 Trudy Festinger, Adoption Disruption: Rates and Correlates, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
ADOPTION 201, 209 (David Brodzinsky & Marshall Schecter eds., 1990).
184 Id.
185 Id. According to Festinger, these studies, however, did not explore the specific
reasons that separated siblings experienced more disruptions (opining that "[p]erhaps the
separation was problematic for these children and influenced their adaptation in the
adoptive home; or perhaps they had more serious problems to begin with, which may
have influenced their having been separately placed"). Id. at 209-10. In addition, there is
at least some evidence that an inability or difficulty with maintaining such relationships
can lead to a disruption in adoption.
186 REITZ & WATSON, supra note 114, at 175.
187 Festinger, supra note 183, at 208; Delores M. Schmidt, James A. Rosenthal & Beth
Bombeck, Parents' Views of Adoption Disruption, 10 CHILD. & YOUTH SERV. REV. 119,
120 (1988) (citing to multiple studies that show a relationship between the age of the
child and the "risk of disruption"); see also Susan Livingston Smith & Jeanne A.
Howard, A Comparative Study of Successful and Disrupted Adoptions, 65 Soc. SERVICE
REV. 250 (1991).
188 Emily Jean McFadden, Placement of Sibling Groups, Single-Parent Adoption, and




191 See generally Borgman, Parental Rights Termination, supra note 181.
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Borgman's detailed study of children in foster care illustrates, once a
biological parent's rights have been terminated1 92 and adoption becomes a
possibility, children grow anxious at the prospect of losing contact with
their siblings. 193 Indeed,
[C]hildren showed understandable anxiety and
suspicion about the unknown and a reluctance to move
again. Some voiced concern about losing activities and
relationships in the community that were important to
them. Some were unwilling to relinquish contact with
siblings and other relatives to whom they were attached
when they were told, honestly, that continuation of such
relationships could not be guaranteed in an adoptive home.
Many felt that acceptance of adoption would be an
expression of disloyalty toward the biological family. 194
This is not to downplay the difficulties in placing siblings together,
especially when it is a large sibling group, when there are a limited
number of potential foster parents, or when one of the siblings has special
needs.195 In addition, it is not uncommon for siblings to come into the
foster care system at different times. 196 This creates the difficulty of either
persuading the adoptive parent to agree to parent the additional sibling
who has now come into care, which she may be unwilling to do,197 or
forcing the original sibling into a new foster care placement with a foster
parent who is willing to take on the new sibling.198 The latter may not be
the optimal choice given that the psychological "bond with the [foster]
parent may be paramount if siblings have been in different foster homes
over an extended period of time and have little attachment to each
192 "Children are placed in a special emotional and legal limbo after the termination of
parental rights and prior to adoption; legal ties and contacts with biological parents are
cut off and no substitute permanent ties yet exist." Patton & Latz, supra note 17, at 787.
Without question, "[t]hey are officially parentless." Borgman, Parental Rights
Termination, supra note 18 1, at 399.
193 Patton & Latz, supra note 17, at 780 ("One of the most frequent reasons children run
away from foster homes is to visit siblings.").
194 Borgman, Parental Rights Termination, supra note 181, at 397-98.
19 See McFadden, supra note 188, at 401-02 (delineating the practical limitations of
foster parents caring for large sibling groups).
196 See, e.g., In re Donte A., 631 N.E.2d 257, 263 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (describing how
five siblings came into foster care at different times); In re Adoption of Anthony, 448
N.Y.2d 377 (Fam. Ct. 1982).
1 McFadden, supra note 188, at 402 ("The other relatives may have difficulty or be
unwilling or unable to accept a new group of children into the extended family.").
198 See id. (explaining how sometimes "the bond with the [foster] parent may be
paramount").
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other."l 99 In such cases, the transition to a post-adoption life with all
siblings together in one household becomes even more complicated
because of the weaker sibling bonds.
V. Possibilities and Challenges of Post-Adoption Contact Between
Siblings
A. Post-Adoption Contact Agreements
Many, if not most, children in foster care know their birth families
and will never experience a "closed adoption" in a traditional sense. In
fact, some children who are adopted out of foster care continue to
maintain relationships with relatives post-adoption. 200 The question then is
whether a legal mechanism should exist to enable these children to
maintain these relationships rather than having to rely purely on informal
mechanisms or on the whim of the adoptive families.20'
Post-adoption contact agreements constitute mutually agreed upon
arrangements between members of birth families and adoptive families to
maintain contact after an adoption has been finalized.202 The types of
"arrangements" run the gamut between "informal, mutual understandings"
between the birth family and adoptive family to "written, formal"
20
agreements.203 In fact, some scholars have argued that no termination of
parental rights should occur without a corresponding adoptive family.204
Such a requirement would relieve the child of having to spend his or her
life in foster care limbo. Moreover, there can be long-term benefits to
having a birth parent voluntarily agree to the termination of his or her
19 Id.
200 KATHERINE A. NELSON, ON THE FRONTIER OF ADOPTION: A STUDY OF SPECIAL-
NEEDS ADOPTIVE FAMILIES 103 (1985) (children in twenty percent of families in the
study maintained contact with a biological relative after they were placed in an adoptive
family); see also Amadio & Deutsch, supra note 105, at 83-85.
201 Post-adoption contact with siblings can be especially important in transracial
adoptions, where the adopted child is of a different race than her adoptive parents.
Maldonado, Permanency v. Biology, supra note 77, at 323. Transracial adoptions are
particularly prevalent when children are adopted from foster care, a fact that is
particularly important given that nationally, twenty-six percent of African-American
children who were adopted from foster care were adopted by parents of a different race.
Id. (citing Lynette Clemetson & Ron Nixon, Breaking Through Adoption's Racial
Barriers, N.Y.TIMES, Aug. 17, 2006, at Al).
202 See Sanger, supra note 121.
203 CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, POSTADOPTION CONTACT AGREEMENTS,
supra note 82, at 1.
204 See Appell, Blending Families, supra note 99, at 1005.
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parental rights rather than the state terminating them involuntarily.205 For
example, one study by Robert Borgman demonstrated that children in
foster care viewed voluntary and involuntary termination of parental rights
very differently. In instances where the parents contested the termination
of their parental rights, the children felt it was disloyal to their birth
families for them to acquiesce in long-term foster care or adoption
planning. Conversely, when the birth parents voluntarily consented to the
termination of their parental rights, the children felt more able to embrace
the transition into adoption. In this way, some birth parents may have
viewed voluntary consent to adoption as a valuable gift to the child.206
When entered into without duress, post-adoption contact agreements may
look very much like any other contract with the requisite elements of
207
offer, acceptance, and consideration. Given that the consideration,
however, is "the placement of the baby with a particular family in
exchange for a promise of continuing contact by the adoptive parent," 208
many courts have been reluctant to enforce such agreements.209
At best, states have been wildly divergent in their willingness to
enforce such agreements.210 The breadth of that divergence makes it
particularly difficult to enter into post-adoption contact agreements with
interstate adoptions because the parties need to determine which state's
law will apply. 211 Given some courts' reluctance to apply traditional
contract principles to those agreements,212 no guarantee exists, for
example that a choice of law provision would be honored. All of this
leaves the enforceability of the contract even more in question. Thus,
205 See Borgman, Parental Rights Termination, supra note 181, at 396-97. Borgman
conducted a study where adoption stability correlated to whether parents had signed
voluntary consents for adoption. "In contrast, parents of 18 of 19 children whose
adoptions had been disrupted or who had remained without adoptive placement had had
their rights terminated involuntarily or by court order. Children usually consider
involuntary PRT a hostile act of disapproval by the agency and the court, and they may
retaliate by undermining adoptive planning." Id. at 397.
206 Id.
207 For a broader discussion of post-adoption contact agreements as contracts, see
Sanger, supra note 121.
208 Widner, supra note 126, at 359.
209 See, e.g., Birth Mother v. Adoptive Parents, 59 P.3d 1233, 1235 (Nev. 2002) (finding
that a post-adoption contact agreement was not enforceable without a specific Nevada
statutory provision allowing for such agreements).
210 See supra Part II.B.
211 See Widner, supra note 126, at 360.
212 Id. at 359 ("[A]doption is a creature of state statutory law, and for both this reason
and important public policy reasons, adoption is not covered by general common law
contract principles.").
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states need to craft statutes that make clear that post-adoption contact
agreements can be enforced, and to provide mechanisms for resolving
disputes when they arise.
B. Mediation
Mediation has long had a place in resolving disputes of legal issues
related to families. It has been a part of child protective services and child
welfare cases for the past thirty years.213 Although mediation has many
different variations, at its most basic, mediation involves an impartial third
party who "acts as a catalyst to help others constructively address and
perhaps resolve a dispute, plan a transaction, or define the contours of a
relationship."214 A core value of mediation is "self-determination,"215
which allows the parties to retain control over the outcome. In mediation,
the mediator acts as a facilitator, giving each party the space to tell his or
her story and to truly be heard.216 In a standard mediation, each side is
given the opportunity to fully tell her story, often with little interruption.
This feature alone can be of tremendous benefit for all parties in the
context of post-adoption sibling visitation. It permits the child to have a
voice in the proceedings, and presents the opportunity for the child to
explain his or her feelings about losing the relationship with her siblings
post-adoption.
For the adoptive parents, who may be the most reluctant to explore
mediation, there can be many benefits of mediation. First, hearing the
child express her feelings about the loss of the sibling relationship may
cause the adoptive parents to reconsider their position, particularly in
situations where the adoptive parents have been opposed to any ongoing
contact between siblings. Second, even in situations where the adoptive
parents continue to oppose ongoing contact with a sibling post-adoption,
the adoptive parents will also have the opportunity to tell their story,
which may include legitimate concerns over ongoing contact with siblings
213 See Marilou Giovannucci & Karen Largent, A Guide to Effective Child Protective
Mediation: Lessons from 25 Years of Practice, 47 FAM. CT. REv. 38, 38 (2009)
(explaining that thirty years ago California, Colorado, and Connecticut created programs
"that brought together parents, child welfare agency staff, attorneys, and others with a
trained mediator to discuss dependency cases"). Mediators also often assist parties with
creating divorce and pre-marital agreements. Id.
214 CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW, LELA PORTER LOVE, ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER &
JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL 266
(2005).
215 Id. at 270.
216 Id. ("Mediators promote party empowerment and self-determination by carving out
space and time for each side to tell their stories and be heard in a meaningful way.")
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who, for example, may be engaging in dangerous behaviors. Listening to
the adoptive parents express those concerns can provide a context for the
child to understand why the sibling relationship will not continue, a
context that currently is absent in the law.
Mediators engage the parties in crafting solutions that will address
the parties' particular needs and concerns. Such engagement "in finding
and power in choosing the solution means the parties are invested in the
outcome, and hence the resolution is more durable." 217 Crafting such
solutions in a post-adoptive sibling visitation context can be particularly
valuable. For example, an adoptive parent who hears about post-adoption
contact with siblings may initially balk at the idea because the adoptive
parent might envision it as weekly visits in his home. He may be more
open to considering it if instead it takes the form of weekly Skyping or
FaceTime chats.218
Although it is clear that mediation allows the parties to be "active
participants in a collaborative process,"219 the role of the child who is not
considered a traditional "party" is less clear. Some of the factors to
consider regarding the degree of participation of the child include the
"child's age and developmental level, emotional
status, an ability to understand the nature of the mediation
process and to articulate wants and provide relevant input,
the relevance to the child of the issues being mediated, the
desire to participate, case dynamics, and the ability to
provide the child adequate support during and after
mediation." 220
Moreover, the parties need to examine the reasons behind the
child's participation.221 A child can be involved in the mediation in a
number of ways. The mediator can interview the child or the "child can
write or dictate something to be read in mediation. The session can be
217 MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 214, at 270.
218 Additionally, for children being adopted from foster care, there may be agency
supports that can be put in place, such as providing children with calling cards or
transportation supports to visit with a sibling outside of the adoptive home.
219 See Giovannucci & Largent, supra note 213, at 42.
220 Id. at 43.
221 Id. (citing Arlene H. Henry, Mediating Child Protection disputes - A Canadian
Perspective: Are We Leaving Room for the Child at the Table? 4TH WORLD CONGRESS
ON FAMILY LAW AND CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (March, 2005), http://www.mediator-
roster.bc.ca/HenryMediatingCPDisputes.pdf)).
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structured so the child's participation is for a particular portion and
purpose, or the child can be present for the entire joint session."222
Providing an avenue for the child to participate can greatly increase the
likelihood of reaching an agreement that will best meet the needs of all the
parties.
Although the number of states that have allowed post-adoption
contact agreements has significantly increased,223 states have lagged
behind other areas of family law in the use of mediation to facilitate such
agreements. While some state statutes include the use of mediation to
address and resolve disputes by providing for mediation when problems
with a post-contact agreement arise,224 almost all have failed to use
mediation to "define the contours of a relationship" in a post-adoption.
contact agreement. That is, unlike other areas of family law where
mediation is now routinely used to assist parties with creating an
agreement, only the Louisiana and New Hampshire statutes specifically
allow for a post-adoption contact agreement to be mediated prior to its
signing.225
The New Hampshire post-adoption contact statute provides for
voluntarily mediated post-adoption contact agreements to be enforceable
only for those adoptions involving children who have been in foster care
or otherwise in the legal custody of the state agency.226 Its stated purpose
is
222 Id.
223 See supra Part II.B.
224 Currently, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Hampshire,
Oklahoma, Oregon, and the District of Columbia require parties to participate in
mediation before they are able to bring petitions to enforce or modify a post-adoption
contact agreement. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-116.01; CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5; CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-715; LA. CHILD. CODE. ANN. art. 1269.8; MINN. STAT. ANN. §
259.58; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:14; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 7505-1.5; OR.
REV. STAT. § 109.305; D.C. CODE § 4-361. In Florida and Maryland, the court may
choose to refer the parties to mediation before an enforcement action is brought. See FL.
STAT. ANN. § 63.0427; MD CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-308. In Massachusetts, a party
can voluntarily choose mediation before moving to enforce the agreement. MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 210 § 6C.
225 Louisiana allows for it only upon the parties' request. LA. CHILD CODE ANN. art.
1269.3(C) ("If requested by the parties, the court may refer them to mediation to assist
them in confecting a continuing contact agreement.").
226 N.H. REV. STAT. § 170-B:14 ("Except in cases involving the department .. . no such
arrangement or understanding shall be binding or enforceable at law or in equity.").
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"to facilitate the timely achievement of permanency
for children who are in [foster care] by providing an option
for the parties to enter into a voluntarily mediated
agreement for ongoing communication or contact that is in
the best interests of the child, that recognizes the parties'
interests and desires for ongoing communication or contact,
that is appropriate given the role of the parties in the child's
life, and that is legally enforceable by the courts." 227
And while the New Hampshire statute allows others to participate
in the mediation upon consent of the parties, only the birth parents,
potential adoptive parents, and foster care agency (if involved) can be
parties to the agreement that is reached through mediation.228 The child
who is the subject of the adoption proceeding cannot be a party to the
agreement in New Hampshire, even through a guardian ad litem, nor can
229the child participate in the mediation without consent of all the parties.
VI. A Model For Moving Forward
While approximately half of the states have enacted statutes that
recognize post-adoption contact agreements in some form, the majority of
those statutes are problematic for a number of reasons. First, the statutes
often limit the parties who can enter into the post-adoption contact
agreements to biological parents and adoptive parents. This limitation does
little to aid those children in foster care who are legally without a
biological parent. The statutes also prevent a child from being a party to
the agreement, even through a guardian ad litem. Second, the vast majority
of those statutes do not provide a mechanism for biological relatives other
than birth parents to retain visitation rights. 230 Therefore, they do little to
ensure that children who are adopted have a legally enforceable way to
continue their relationships with their siblings post-adoption. Third, many
exist purely as "agreements" with no enforcement mechanism. Lastly,
these statutes all require that the adoptive parents consent to the ongoing
visitation post-adoption, but provide no incentive for the adoptive parents
to consent. The statutory requirement of consent is not surprising given the
227 Id. § 170-B:14 (ll).
228 Id. at 11(b) ("Other people may be invited to participate in the mediation by mutual
consent of the department, birth parents, and prospective adoptive parents. However,
these invitees shall not be parties to any agreement reached during that mediation.").
229 Id. That said, "[i]f the child is 14 years of age or older, the agreement also shall
contain the written assent of the child." Id. at 11(e).
230 See supra note 82.
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United States Supreme Court's decision in Troxel v. Granville striking
down a third party visitation statute because the statute failed to give
"special weight" to the legal parent's wishes regarding visitation. Because
the Troxel Court failed to articulate a clear standard defining "special
weight," states have enacted statutory provisions requiring the adoptive
parent to agree to the visitation.
To overcome these limitations, states should broaden the scope of
the post-adoption contact provisions in their statutes to address the very
real needs of those children in foster care who are legally parentless. First,
the statutory provisions should include the possibility of post-adoption
contact with biological siblings. That is, at the very least, they should
allow for the birth siblings to be parties' to the post-adoption contact
agreement. Given the importance of the sibling bond and the harm that
befalls most children when that bond is broken, the statutes should not
limit post-adoption contact to birth parents alone. Moreover, unlike a child
whose parental rights have not been terminated for whom a visitation
agreement with a birth parent is likely to provide opportunities for
visitation with siblings, a child in foster care whose parental rights have
been terminated legally has no "birth parents," and therefore no avenue for
visitation with his siblings. Second, the statutes should allow for either the
state foster care agency, which has legal custody for children in foster
care, or the children themselves, through a guardian ad litem, to petition
for visitation with their biological siblings, and enter into a post-adoption
contact agreement. Third, the state post-adoption contact agreement
provisions should provide that the agreements be legally enforceable.
Lastly, to the extent that a state views Troxel as constraining its
ability to allow post-adoption contact with biological siblings without the
consent of the adoptive parent, states should rely on mediation to
encourage the adoptive parent to seriously consider the long-term benefit
to the child of allowing, and even facilitating, post-adoption visitation with
siblings-of-origin. Employing mediation can have the benefit of giving
voice to the adopted child's wishes about continuing contact, which may
lead the adoptive parents to be more likely to enter into a post-adoption
contact agreement. It can allow for creative ways to structure post-
adoption contact beyond "traditional" in-person visitation, through
technology such as Skype, FaceTime, and videos. It also decreases the
chances of the parties not complying with the agreement given that parties
are more likely to comply with mediated agreements that they have had a
voice in creating. Finally, mediation can provide a wider range of
enforcement mechanisms, including returning to mediation when facing
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difficulties with compliance or with requests for modification of the
agreement.
VII. Conclusion
The bonds between siblings are often the strongest that children
will form in their lifetimes; for many they are simply irreplaceable.
Nowhere is this more true than for the hundreds of thousands of children
living in foster care as a result of suffering from abuse or neglect in their
homes-of-origin. Studies have repeatedly demonstrated that the bonds
siblings form with each other when they have suffered trauma at home are
often even stronger than those in other families. These children have
learned to rely on each other to cope with and endure tremendous
difficulties. Moreover, children often become even more emotionally
reliant on their siblings when the rights of their biological parents are
terminated; they have seen their legal connection to their biological parent
permanently severed, and they cling even more fiercely to the connection
they have with what remains of their biological family. And yet, now that
the children are in foster care and have been "freed for adoption," in most
states they face the potential of having the bond with their biological
siblings permanently severed as well. The traditional view of adoption in
this country over the course of the last century was that legal adoption is a
complete severing of ties with the family-of-origin, replacing that family
with new, loving, adoptive parents who have all of the fundamental Due
Process rights in the "care, custody and control of their children" that were
once accorded the biological family.
Over the past thirty years, a movement toward a more open model
of adoption has gained traction across the United States, with over half of
the states enacting statutes that allow birth parents and adoptive parents to
enter into post-adoption contact agreements. On the whole, however, these
statutes are not broad enough to address the difficulties of children
adopted out of foster care who wish to maintain their relationships with
their biological siblings. State statutes should broaden the description of
family members who can be parties to such agreements to include
biological siblings and the adopted children themselves. Moreover, they
should provide mediation services for prospective adoptive families
adopting children from foster care. Through such mediation the child
would have an opportunity to give voice to her concerns about losing
contact with her siblings permanently. Doing so could increase the
willingness of the adoptive parents to enter into a post-adoptive contact
agreement allowing for the real possibility of a child who is adopted out of
Vol. 19:1124
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foster care to avoid the devastating psychological effects of permanently
losing contact with his siblings-of-origin.
